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COMMENT
GRAND JURY DISCLOSURE IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
Most criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust Act' have be-
gun with grand jury investigations.' The secretive nature of criminal anti-
trust activity often makes it impossible for the federal government to
marshal the evidence necessary to obtain an indictment before convening
the grand jury.3 The extensive use of the grand jury as an investigatory
tool is, "in many aspects, unique to antitrust."4
Civil antitrust plaintiffs are well aware of the valuable factfinding func-
tion performed by the grand jury and often seek discovery of grand jury
transcripts from related criminal actions.5 In deciding whether to grant
these requests, courts are required to balance the established principle of
grand jury secrecy against the goal of effectuating civil enforcement of the
antitrust laws.6 The analytical starting point for a court considering
whether to grant civil antitrust plaintiffs access to grand jury materials is
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).7 Rule 6(e) does not absolutely
bar disclosure of grand jury materials, but instead expressly permits disclo-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Sherman Act prohibits any unreasonable interference,
by contract, combination, or conspiracy, with the ordinary, usual and freely competitive
pricing or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade.
2. See Brief for the United States as Respondent at 6, Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., cert.
granted, 455 U.S. 1015 (1982) ("Antitrust Division investigates per se violations almost ex-
clusively by grand jury"). See also Lewin, The Conduct of Grand Jury Proceedings in Anti-
trust Cases, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 112 (1940); ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
233 (1975).
3. Steinhouse, Antitrust Grand Jury Procedure, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 447 (1974).
4. Id
5. See infra text accompanying notes 147-80.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in pertinent part:
(2) General rule of secrecy. . . .any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph 3(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule....
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
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sure in four situations.' In antitrust litigation, the largest amount of con-
troversy has been generated by the provision of the rule permitting
disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." 9
While the rule states a factually simple condition precedent to the disclo-
sure of grand jury materials, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the requesting party must demonstrate "particularized need" before disclo-
sure will be granted.' 0
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be
made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such at-
torney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney
for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of
such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than
assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's
duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall
promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such
disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclo-
sure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the
court may direct.
8. The four situations in which disclosure is permitted are the following:
(1) Attorneys for the federal government and government personnel assisting them in
the investigation are permitted access without court permission, FED. R. CRIM. P.6(e)(3)(A)(i), (ii);
(2) A court may direct disclosure "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding," FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i);
(3) A court may order disclosure to a defendant upon a showing that there may be
grounds "to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury,"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii); and
(4) A witness before the grand jury may voluntarily divulge the contents of his testimony
inasmuch as he is under no obligation of secrecy with regard to his own testimony, FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.05[l (2d ed. 1982).
Furthermore, the doctrine of secrecy does not apply if the requested material does not
come within the ambit of "matters occurring before the grand jury." FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2). See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
10. See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1979);
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872 (1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
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Present controversy exists over the applicability of the "particularized
need" standard to requests for grand jury disclosure by state attorneys gen-
eral pursuant to title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976." Section 4F of title II112 directs the Attorney General of the
United States to make available "to the extent permitted by law, any inves-
tigative files or other materials" requested by state attorneys general for
possible state parens patriae actions under the Sherman Act. 3 The con-
troversy involves the proper construction to be given this provision,' 4 and
has rekindled commentary as to the necessity and utility of the doctrine of
grand jury secrecy in the antitrust arena."
This Comment will place the doctrine of grand jury secrecy in its proper
historical perspective and will explore the controversy that has arisen in
parens patriae antitrust actions. It will then expand its focus to embrace
issues regarding the utility and current application of the particularized
need standard in both public and private antitrust litigation. The Com-
ment will conclude that the particularized need standard should not be
applied in parens patriae actions. In a more general context, the Comment
will argue that a more liberal application of the particularized need stan-
dard should prevail in cases where that standard is controlling.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE GRAND JURY
The precursor of the modern grand jury was established in England in
1166 by King Henry II's Assize of Clarendon. 16 Often comprised of a
States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-
83 (1958).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 72-122. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)-15(h) (1977 Supp. I).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15(f) (1976).
13. The parens patriae provisions of title III are an addition to the Clayton Act, which
amended the Sherman Antitrust Act by adding prohibitions against price discrimination,
tying and exclusive contracts, mergers and interlocking directorates, where these practices
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). Parens patriae actions under title III are, however, limited to
violations of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1) (1976).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 72-122.
15. See generally Kintner, Griffin & Goldstone, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Kintner); Maximov, Access by State Attorneys General to Federal Grand Jury Antitrust Inves-
tigative Materials, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1981); Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials
Under Clayton Act Section 4F(b), 79 MICH. L. REV. 1234 (1981).
16. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (7th ed. 1956); see also C.
LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 109 (1962); Calkins, Grand Jury
Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455, 456 (1965). The Assize of Clarendon proclaimed that
for the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of justice enquiries be made
throughout each county and hundred. . . under oath to tell the truth; if in their
19831
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"body of knowledgeable local gentry," it was designed to investigate those
suspected of having committed serious crimes.' 7 In time, the grand jury,
known then as the Grand Assize, proved to be a particularly effective de-
vice in the King's arsenal for usurping control of the administration of
justice from the Church and the feudal barons. I" In its infancy, the grand
jury was a "public body," and it was not until 1368 that it conducted its
inquiries secretly in an attempt to free itself from control by the Crown.' 9
As a legal concept, the doctrine of grand jury secrecy dates from the Earl
of Shaftesbury Trial,20 and the Colledge2 I case.22 Shaftesbury and Col-
ledge were Protestants who avidly opposed King Charles II's attempts to
reestablish the Catholic Church in England.2 3 The King sought their in-
dictment for treason and demanded that the grand jury, sitting in London,
conduct its inquiry in public.24 The grand jury adamantly refused, con-
ducted its proceeding in secret, and failed to return a "true bill."25
In the years that followed, the grand jury's significance dwindled and,
by the twentieth century, the return of indictments had become pro
forma.26 Rather than continuing to expend the time and money required
to preserve the grand jury's now perfunctory role, Parliament passed the
hundred or township there be any man who is accused or generally suspected of
being a robber or murderer or thief. . . since our lord the King was King.
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra.
17. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 6
(1977).
18. Id at 7.
19. Id
20. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681).
21. 8 How. St. Tr. 563 (1681).
22. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 17, at 9.
23. Id
24. Id at 9-10.
25. Id Although these cases are often cited as establishing the "true independence" of
the grand jury, King Charles did not acquiesce to the London grand jury's show of indepen-
dence. In what may be the first known instance of "forum-shopping," the King had the case
presented to a "friendlier" grand jury in the town of Oxford. It returned a "true bill." Id.
John Dryden, the King's favorite poet, used the medium of poetry to express his distaste for
the London grand jury's action:
So easie still it proves, in Factious Times,
With publick Zeal to Cancel private Crimes:
How safe is Treason, and how sacred ill,
Where none can sin against the People's Will:
Where Crowds can wink; and no offence be known,
Since in another's guilt they find their own.
Quoted in Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 701, 718 n.84 (1972).
26. C. LOVELL, supra note 16, at 546-47.
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Administration of Justice Act in 1933,27 abolishing it.28 Except for
"charges of treason committed outside the realm, violations of the official
secrets laws, and oppressive acts by governors of the colonies," indictments
are now returned by magistrates after preliminary hearing.29
While England allowed other governmental bodies to assume the grand
jury's tasks, the United States has been unwilling to forego the institution
of the grand jury originally brought over by the English colonists. 31 It is
embedded in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 31
which requires grand jury indictments for all "capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime[s]."32 Although the Constitution does not mention whether
the grand jury should meet in public or private, there has never been any
question that the grand jury should meet in private in order to preserve the
doctrine of secrecy that had long existed under English common law.
33
This common law doctrine of grand jury secrecy has been codified in Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).34
Rule 6(e) sets forth the general principle that, subject to certain enumer-
ated exceptions, grand jury material should not be disclosed.35 The most
troublesome provision of rule 6(e) is the general exception allowing disclo-
sure "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding. 36 Although this exception obviously permits disclo-
sure of certain matters occurring before the grand jury, it provides no stan-
27. Administration of Justice Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 36 (1933), excerpted from 8 H.
HALSBURY, STATUTES OF ENGLAND 307-08 (1969):
(I) . . . grand juries are hereby abolished, but where a bill of indictment has been
signed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the indictment shall be pro-
ceeded with in the same manner as it would have been proceeded with before the
commencement of this Act if it had been found by a grand jury, and all enactments
and rules of law relating to procedure in connection with indictable offences shall
have effect subject only to such modifications as are rendered necessary by the
provisions of this section and of the section next following ....
28. Id
29. C. LOVELL, supra note 16, at 547.
30. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 17, at 10.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. The relevant part of the fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un-
less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger. ...
Id. But cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (requirement of indictment by the
grand jury has not been held applicable to the states).
33. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 113 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
34. See supra note 7.
35. See id
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(C)(i).
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dard to determine when such information should be disclosed. In light of
the long common law heritage of secrecy, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted rule 6(e) as allowing the secrecy of grand jury proceedings to be
breached only upon a showing of "particularized need" by the requesting
party.
37
The question of what constitutes "particularized need" has been a
thorny one, and the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the matter have
not been unwavering. 31 In an effort to avoid the burden of demonstrating
particularized need, state attorneys general have recently argued that sec-
tion 4F of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976"9
entitles them to certain federal grand jury materials without the necessity
of a preliminary showing of need.4 °
II. DISCLOSURE IN PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197641 signifi-
cantly changes the scheme of federal antitrust enforcement by generally
broadening the government's investigatory and enforcement powers.42 Ti-
tle III of the Antitrust Improvements Act authorizes state attorneys general
to bring treble damage actions as parens patriae for its citizens to redress
Sherman Act violations.43 This provision has thus far proven to be the
37. See supra note 10.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 152-80.
39. Section 4F provides in pertinent part:
To assist a State attorney general in evaluating the notice or in bringing any action
[under the Sherman Act], the Attorney General of the United States shall, upon
request by such state attorney general, make available to him, to the extent permit-
ted by law, any investigative files or other materials which are or may Ise relevant
or material to the actual or potential cause of action ....
15 U.S.C. § 15(f) (1976).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 72, 74-98.
41. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in sections of 15, 18 & 28 U.S.C.
(1977 Supp. 1)).
42. Title I, the Antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14, amends
the Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, 15 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (1970), to allow the Justice De-
partment to issue civil investigative demands (CIDs) to investigate "activities in preparation
for a merger, acquisition, joint venture, or similar transaction, which, if consummated, may
result in an antitrust violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (c). See also A. NEALE, ANTITRUST LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 375-78 (2d ed. 1970). Prior to the 1976 amendments,
the Justice Department could not use its CID power to investigate a proposed but uncon-
summated merger or acquisition. United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir.
1965). Title II, Premerger Notification, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a), mandates prior notification of the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission of proposed acquisitions and merg-
ers of significant size. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(2). This provision is intended to supply the govern-
ment with the precious time needed to develop their case before the egg has been scrambled.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c).
[Vol. 32:437
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most controversial.
The parens patriae provisions of the Antitrust Improvements Act were
adopted in response to "the present inability of our judicial system to af-
ford equal justice to consumers for violations of the antitrust laws.""4 Sec-
tion 4F(a) of the Antitrust Improvements Act provides that whenever the
United States has brought suit under the Clayton Act 45 and the challenged
activities may give rise to potential claims under the antitrust laws, the
United States Attorney General should notify the appropriate state attor-
ney general.46 Section 4F(b) of the Antitrust Improvements Act allows the
state attorney general to request access to "investigative files or other
materials" for possible state parens patriae actions under the Sherman
Act.47 The United States Attorney General must then turn over such files
"to the extent permitted by law."48
The federal circuit courts are divided over the proper interpretation of
this provision.49 At the heart of this dispute is the meaning of the terms
"investigative files or other materials" and "to the extent permitted by
law." The first question facing a court is whether "investigative files or
other materials" include grand jury materials. If so, a court will then be
faced with the determination whether the phrase "to the extent permitted
by law" incorporates the particularized need standard.
A. Legislative History
The Antitrust Improvements Act was passed amidst intense political
pressures generated by strong opposition from the business community.50
As is the case with the Antitrust Improvements Act in general, the legisla-
tive history of section 4F is sparse and inconclusive." It is clear, however,
44. 122 CONG. REC. 29,148 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976 & 1980 Supp. IV).
46. See supra note 39.
47. See id
48. Id.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 72-122.
50. The Senate floor manager of the bill commented: "Over the last 3 months ...
[tihere have been approximately 85 votes, two filibusters, two successful cloture votes, hun-
dreds of printed amendments, [and] unprecedented parliamentary maneuvering. 122
CONG. REC. 29,145 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk).
51. One commentator succinctly addressed the problems with the Act's legislative his-
tory in the following passage:
Because of the extraordinary procedures adopted by the Act's sponsors to secure
passage, resulting in the enactment-without conference--of a compromise bill
that replaced three House-passed bills and an omnibus Senate-passed bill, and be-
cause of the number of separate bills and titles that were the subject of testimony,
the legislative history of the Act is a patchwork of testimony, floor statements, de-
19831
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that the parens patriae provisions were designed to create a new federal
antitrust remedy "to compensate the victims of antitrust offenses, to pre-
vent antitrust violators from being unjustly enriched, and to deter future
antitrust violations."52 Both the House and Senate reports clearly lament
the federal antitrust laws' consumer-related remedial inadequacies and
recognize the need to improve antitrust enforcement mechanisms.13 Al-
though the general legislative purpose is clear, the scope and force of that
purpose is regrettably murky and ill-defined.5 4 One of the issues left un-
clear is whether Congress, by providing for state parens patriae actions,
also intended to ease the burden on state attorneys general bringing such
actions by allowing them access to federal grand jury materials without a
preliminary showing of particularized need.
The House discussion of section 4F(b)'s disclosure language, which re-
ferred to an earlier version of the bill,5" is critical to a determination of
legislative intent because the disclosure language originated in the House
and was subsequently adopted by the Senate.56 The House specifically
bates, Committee Reports and 'Additional Statements' inserted after the conclu-
sion of floor debates.
Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
679, 682 (1977); see also Kintner, supra note 15, at 1-3.
52. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
53. It was noted in the House Report that "[flederal antitrust statutes do not presently
provide effective redress for the injury inflicted upon consumers [and] revised class action
provisions [aimed at] fashion[ing] a mechanism for consumer redress ... have been disap-
pointing." H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 52, at 4-6. The Senate report concludes that a
"major factor underlying the ineffectiveness of the antitrust laws is the inadequacy of ex-
isting investigatory, enforcement, deterrent, and procedural aspects of present law." S. REP.
No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976).
54. One commentator conceded that while
[s]ome insights can be gleaned by floor statements by the sponsors of the bills and
from committee reports, [they] are in some instances contradicting and ... of lim-
ited value because many provisions ... were either not enacted or enacted in an
amended form. Thus, a definitive interpretation of the Act must await judicial
action ....
Kintner, supra note 15, at 1, 3.
55. The distinctions between the § 4F(b) discussed by the House Committee and the
present law are: (1) the earlier version only granted access to the Department of Justice's
files for purposes of bringing an action under § 4C, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1976), while the pres-
ent law allows access for purposes of bringing any action under the Clayton Act; and (2) the
"usage clause" of the earlier version was conjunctive "to assist a State attorney general in
evaluating the notice and in bringing any action." (emphasis added). This was changed by
substituting "or" for "and." United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 948
n.ll (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
56. Section 4F(b) was included in the final enactment of title III of the Antitrust Im-
provements Act at the insistence of the "acting" House conferees. 122 CONG. REC. 29,160
(1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk). Because of the threat of another Senate filibuster, a
"formal" conference was impossible. Instead, the Senate sponsors and others met infor-
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addressed the meaning of the clause "to the extent permitted by law" as
mandating disclosure "except where specifically prohibited."" Although
this explanation is couched among several references to the House's "de-
sire" to encourage full federal-state cooperation, the report is bereft of any
reference to grand jury materials or to what constitutes investigative files
and other materials.
The only reference to grand jury materials in the reports of either house
is found in a provision that was included in an earlier version of the Senate
bill.5" This provision would have afforded a "private plaintiff" access to
"documentary material and testimony furnished to a grand jury" upon the
completion of any criminal or civil proceeding arising out of the federal
grand jury investigation. 9 In conjunction with this provision, the Senate
report acknowledges that, under existing law, a private treble damages
plaintiff may gain access to grand jury materials only upon a showing of
particularized need.6 ° Although the report cited the traditional reasons for
grand jury secrecy, 6' it recognized that the "trend in recent court decisions
is clearly in favor of more liberal disclosure. . . to private plaintiffs who
have filed subsequent treble damage antitrust actions."62 Maintenance of
grand jury secrecy, under those circumstances, was viewed by the Senate
as "contrary to the efficient and economic administration of justice."63
The report concluded with the Senate's "determination that the reasons for
grand jury secrecy are generally no longer relevant" upon completion of
the government's case." The Senate, however, did allow for the district
courts' imposition of appropriate protective orders "on the grant of access
• . . as the interests of justice may require."65
Notably, this version of the Antitrust Improvements Act also included
section 4F(b).66 It is unclear, however, whether the Senate provision was
ultimately excluded due to potential conflict with the judicial branch over
the necessity of showing particularized need or because it duplicated sec-
tion 4F(b)'s disclosure provision and was inconsistent with Congress's in-
mally with representative members of the House to work out a compromise, without amend-
ment, that would be acceptable to both Houses. See Scher, supra note 51, at 681 n.9.
57. H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 52, at 17.
58. See S. REP. No. 803, supra note 53, at 33, 110.
59. Id at 33.
60. Id
61. These policy reasons were first developed by the court in United States v. Amazon
Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md. 1931). See infra note 183.
62. S. REP. No. 803, supra note 53, at 35.
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id at 33.
66. Id
19831
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tent to have private civil antitrust plaintiffs seek the aid of their state
attorney general, rather than instituting private antitrust actions.67
The only other specific reference to the disclosure language of section
4F(b) was made during Senate debate by Senator Hruska who objected to
section 4F(b), fearing that it might turn the Department of Justice into a
"massive document distribution center."68 Senator Abourezk, floor man-
ager of the bill, replied to this criticism by saying that 4F(b) "specifically
limits the Attorney General's power to release documents to whatever his
powers are under existing law [and] [u]nder existing law, he cannot turn
over materials given in response to a grand jury demand. ' 69 Hruska's ob-
jection indicates that he perceived 4F(b) to include grand jury materials
because the bulk of the documentation required to present a successful
case is comprised of grand jury related information. 7° Abourezk's reply is
ambiguous since it is not clear whether he interpreted this provision to
incorporate the existing law, requiring a court order prefaced by a showing
of the particularized need standard, or whether the provision dispensed
with the particularized need and required only a court order.7 '
Because of the inconclusive nature of the legislative history surrounding
section 4F(b), courts have been faced with difficult issues of statutory inter-
pretation. This lack of a clear congressional directive has resulted in an
even split among the federal circuit courts that have been required to inter-
pret the provision.
B. Section 4F(b) Disclosure Provision Causes Split Among the Circuits
Federal courts of appeals are divided over the question of whether "in-
vestigative files or other materials" include grand jury materials, and if so,
67. 122 CONG. REC. 29,147 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk). Adding to the confu-
sion is Sen. Abourezk's comment that the omission of this provision of the bill was one of
the "compromises that the sponsors have been forced to make to the House in this legisla-
tion in order to avoid a second filibuster." Id
68. 122 CONG. REC. at 29,144 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
69. 122 CONG. REC. at 29,160 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk) (emphasis supplied).
70. The Senate's discussion of § 202(1) indicates its awareness of the large importance
of grand jury materials in developing the evidence needed to prosecute such cases: "It is
contrary to the efficient and economic administration of justice to require private plaintiffs
to expend time and effort in developing facts which have already been developed before the
grand jury." S. REP. No. 803, supra note 53, at 35.
71. It should be noted that a court order permitting disclosure is required in all except
two cases. First, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i) permits disclosure of grand jury materials
without a court order to "an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty." Second, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) was amended in 1977 to permit disclosure
of grand jury information to "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an
attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of
such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." FED. R. CriM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
[Vol. 32:437
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whether the language in the Antitrust Improvements Act limiting disclo-
sure "to the extent permitted by law" forbids disclosure without the tradi-
tional requisite showing of "particularized need." The Fourth and Ninth
Circuits have answered both questions in the affirmative;72 the Second and
Seventh Circuits have answered both questions in the negative. 3
The Ninth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to rule on this
matter in United States v. B.F Goodrich Co.74 The case arose after a fed-
eral grand jury was convened to investigate possible antitrust violations by
a major tire company.7" An indictment was not returned, but the United
States instituted a civil action against the company.76 The State of Califor-
nia thereafter filed an antitrust action against Goodrich and requested the
district court to produce the federal grand jury materials.7 7 The motion
was granted by the district court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a short
per curiam opinion.78
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the "investigative
files" language in section 4F(b) included the grand jury materials.79 The
court described the legislative history of the Antitrust Improvements Act
as being "equivocal,"80 and stated that state attorneys general need not
show "particularized need" because Congress intended to place the states
on a "different footing" than private parties bringing antitrust actions.8 '
Most of the court's opinion delineated the bounds within which such dis-
closure could occur. The court concluded this discussion with a list of
"protective orders" aimed at preserving the secrecy of the grand jury
materials upon disclosure. 2
72. United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981); United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir.
1980).
73. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982),
petition for cert. pending sub nor. Connecticut v. Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 81-1595 (U.S. Feb. 17,
1982); In re Illinois Petition to Inspect And Copy Grand Jury Materials, 659 F.2d 800, 801
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., Inc., 455 U.S. 1015 (1982).
74. 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Id at 799.
76. Id
77. Id at 800.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id at 801. The court placed the following limitations on the disclosure of the grand
jury materials: (1) disclosure was limited to state attorneys general and designated members
of their staff; (2) only one copy of the materials would be provided, the custody of which
would be the responsibility of the state attorney general; (3) disclosure of the names and
testimony of witnesses would be prohibited until trial or until they were disclosed to the
defendant; (4) the disclosure would only be allowed pursuant to a protective order on a
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In United States v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp. ," the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed some of the issues left open by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Goodrich. Colonial Chevrolet involved an appeal by the State of Virginia
from an order denying disclosure of grand jury materials resulting from a
successful criminal antitrust action brought by the federal government.8 4
The district court denied disclosure on two grounds.8 5 First, it held that
grand jury transcripts are not included within the meaning of "investiga-
tive files" to which the Antitrust Improvements Act refers.86 Second, the
court held that even if such transcripts were included in the investigative
files, the requesting party must make the showing of particularized need
inasmuch as the Antitrust Improvements Act permits disclosure only "to
the extent permitted by law."'8'  The court concluded that disclosure for
the purpose of assisting in the preparation of an actual or potential civil
antitrust suit did not constitute such particularized need. 8
In reversing the decision, the Fourth Circuit criticized the district court's
narrow construction of the term "investigative files."' 9 The court found
such a restrictive interpretation to be "plainly contrary to the legislative
purposes" of the Antitrust Improvements Act.9" The court emphasized
Congress's intention to encourage the filing of parens patriae actions to
assist in the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. The court noted,
moreover, that grand jury materials are often the most important part of
the investigative file.9 ' In light of these considerations, the court con-
cluded that it was extremely unlikely that Congress intended to exclude
such materials from the definition of investigative files.92
stipulation between counsel ensuring confidentiality; (5) use of the materials would be lim-
ited to preparation of the instant case or actions under other state or federal statutes; (6) the
Attorney General need not disclose the materials if he objects to their disclosure; (7) the
Attorney General may not disclose the materials until the grand jury completes its term and
if an indictment has been returned, the materials may not be disclosed until the criminal
charges are no longer pending; and (8) state attorneys general may not use the materials in a
criminal prosecution. Id at 801.
83. 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).
84. Id at 945. The indictment charged Tidewater (Virginia) Automobile Dealers Asso-
ciation and certain of its members with engaging in a price fixing conspiracy in connection
with charges for auto body repairs. All of the defendant-appellees entered nolo contendere
pleas which were accepted by the district court. Id
85. Id at 946, 948.
86. Id at 948.
87. Id at 946.
88. Id at 949.
89. Id at 946.
90. Id
91. Id at 947.
92. Id
[Vol. 32:437
Grand Jury Disclosure
The court interpreted Senator Abourezk's statement that the statute in-
corporated existing law9 3 as merely stating that under current law the At-
torney General may not unilaterally disclose federal grand jury materials
to the states, but must instead seek a court order prior to disclosure. 94
Thus, Senator Abourezk's comments were not addressed to the particular-
ized need standard, but rather merely reiterated the requirement of prior
judicial approval.9"
Expanding upon the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the court distinguished the
state's request from private requests on the ground that the Antitrust Im-
provements Act placed state attorneys general in a position "adjunct to
that of the Attorney General himself. . . in the scheme of enforcement of
the federal antitrust laws."96 Congress, by virtue of the Antitrust Improve-
ments Act, had struck a balance between the public interest in disclosure
and the need for secrecy in favor of the former.9 7 Thus, the court granted
the state's disclosure request without requiring a demonstration of particu-
larized need.9"
The first federal court of appeals to hold that grand jury materials could
not be disclosed absent a showing of particularized need was the Seventh
Circuit in In re Illinois Petition to Inspect. 99 The attorney general of Illi-
nois sought production of materials from a prior federal grand jury investi-
gation that had resulted in an indictment in a bid-rigging conspiracy in
piping construction projects in the Chicago area."°° The district court de-
nied the state's motion for production of the grand jury materials, and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 10
In reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether grand
jury materials even fell within the ambit of section 4F(b) inasmuch as they
were not specifically mentioned therein, and inasmuch as that provision
was directed to the Department of Justice which has no power to authorize
93. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
94. 629 F.2d at 947.
95. Id
96. Id at 950.
97. Id The court stated further that the burden of opposing such disclosure would rest
with those who sought to have it denied. Protective limitations would also apply to such
disclosure where appropriate. Id
98. Id
99. 659 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 801.
101. The State of Illinois was provided with fewer than 20 documents in response to its
request directed to the Department of Justice pursuant to § 4F(b) of the Act. The state then
moved pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) for production of all grand jury materials. Id at
801.
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grand jury disclosure in the absence of a court order. '1 2 Even if grand jury
materials were included within section 4F(b), the language limiting disclo-
sure "to the extent permitted by law" clearly suggested to the court that
disclosure would be subject to the requirements of rule 6(e).1 1
The court relied on the legislative history of section 4F(b) to support its
conclusion."° The exchange between Senators Abourezk and Hruska, 0 5
together with the House's construction of the language limiting availability
of the files "except where specifically prohibited,"'" demonstrated Con-
gress's recognition that existing law prohibits the release of grand jury
materials in the absence of a preliminary showing of particularized
need. 7 Since Congress was cognizant of existing law, the court reasoned
that it was highly unlikely that the Antitrust Improvements Act was in-
tended to make new law regarding the disclosure of grand jury
materials. '0
Consistent with this line of reasoning, the court concluded its opinion
with a restrictive view of the purposes of title III. The creation of parens
patriae actions was labelled a "limited" response to two "technical
problems" in the prior scheme of enforcement: the difficulty of obtaining
class certification and the difficulty of maintaining class actions. Io9
In dissent, Judge East" 0 argued for a more liberal construction of the
Antitrust Improvements Act. The dissent pointed out that the major pur-
pose of the Antitrust Improvements Act was to induct the states into the
"antitrust business by lending them the federal investigative work product
regarding antitrust violations."' The dissent argued that any ambiguity
in the provision should be resolved in favor of disclosure and stated that
the rationales underlying grand jury secrecy could be adequately preserved
by appropriate protective orders." 2
The numerical split between the circuits became evenly balanced with
102. Id at 802-04.
103. Id at 804.
104. Id at 806.
105. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
107. 659 F.2d at 806. Although both the Seventh and Second Circuits reached the same
conclusion regarding these aspects of the legislative history, neither court gave a definitive
explanation for this interpretation beyond citing the history and concluding that Rule 6(e)
applies.
108. 659 F.2d at 805-06.
109. Id at 807.
110. Senior District Judge William G. East of the District of Oregon was sitting by
designation on the Seventh Circuit's panel. Id. at 801.
111. Id at 808 (East, J., dissenting).
112. Id at 809 (East, J., dissenting).
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the addition of the Second Circuit's opinion in In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion of Cuisinarts, Inc. "' Cuisinarts involved the disclosure of grand jury
materials in connection with a federal grand jury's investigation and in-
dictment of a food processor manufacturer for resale price maintenance." 4
The district court denied the state attorneys' general motions for produc-
tion of the materials" 5 and the Second Circuit affirmed, invoking the
"long shadows of history enshroud[ing]" the grand jury and the "time-
honored policy of secrecy."' 16
The Second Circuit began with the premise that because grand jury
materials are solely within the province of the judicial branch, they can
only be disclosed by court order. 1 7 The court, therefore, reasoned that
grand jury materials are not part of the Justice Department's "files.""18
The Antitrust Improvements Act itself is addressed to the Attorney Gen-
eral and not to the courts--the keepers of grand jury secrecy."' As an
alternative ground for its holding, the court asserted that disclosure of in-
vestigative files is permitted only to the extent allowed by law.' 20 Since
rule 6(e) contains no standard for determining when disclosure is permissi-
ble, the court reasoned that Congress intended to incorporate the judicially
created "particularized need" standard into section 4F(b).' 2' The court
argued that Senator Abourezk's comments and the House report both sup-
ported its interpretation that the states had not been relieved of the burden
of showing particularized need prior to obtaining grand jury materials. 22
C. Section 4F(b) Authorizes Grand Jury Disclosure to State Attorneys
General Without A Showing of Particularized Need
Section 4F(b) of the Antitrust Improvements Act created a new statutory
cause of action 23 intended to alleviate the complex problems that often
113. 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. pending sub nom. Connecticut v.
Cuisinarts, Inc., No. 81-1595 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982).
114. Id
115. The district court denied these motions without prejudice allowing the states to
reapply for disclosure upon demonstration of a particularized need. Id at 30.
116. 665 F.2d at 27-28.
117. Id at 31.
118. Id
119. Id at 34.
120. Id at 32.
121. id at 33.
122. Id at 34.
123. Kintner, supra note 15, at 24-25 & 23 n. 140. The authors conclude that since H.R.
8532 was passed by the Senate, authorizing civil actions by state attorneys general without
referring to § 4 of the Clayton Act, parens patriae actions can be characterized as a new
cause of action.
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plagued individual consumers attempting to take on antitrust violators. 124
Congress envisioned a new scheme of federal antitrust enforcement, using
parens patriae as a vehicle to encourage federal-state cooperation. The
keystone of this cooperative enforcement effort hinges on the free flow of
information between these governmental units. Section 4F(b) created a
conduit through which information gathered during the federal investiga-
tion of antitrust violations can flow to state attorneys general to aid them
in the enforcement of federal antitrust laws. If the Antitrust Improvements
Act is to be given full effect, section 4F(b) must be read in harmony with
rule 6(e) to permit grand jury disclosure under appropriate circumstances
without a showing of particularized need.
An examination of the practical realities of antitrust litigation leads to
the inescapable conclusion that "investigative files or other materials" en-
compass grand jury information. A contrary conclusion would render sec-
tion 4F(b) of the Antitrust Improvements Act a dead letter, something that
must be avoided under standard canons of statutory construction. 25 As
the United States cautioned in its memorandum filed with the district court
in Cuisinarts, "[w]ere grand jury materials not encompassed by Section
4F(b), in most cases the only materials the Attorney General could provide
to the states would be preliminary staff memorandum requesting authority
to commence a grand jury investigation."' 2 6 Furthermore, the use of
grand jury materials as an investigative tool is well recognized.121 That the
life of such information can extend well beyond the confines of the partic-
ular grand jury that produces it, is amply illustrated by the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division's practice of making a stenographic transcript of
all testimony before the grand jury. 2 ' The Division may disclose the in-
formation to other government personnel aiding in the investigation, 29
124. S. REP. No. 803, supra note 53, at 39.
125. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (statutes should not be construed
to render them meaningless); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (a statute
should be construed so as to give effect to every word and it should not be interpreted in a
way that renders one part of it inoperative) Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)
(every clause and word of a statute should be given effect).
126. Memorandum of United States at 14, In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts,
Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981).
127. See generally C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISER ANTITRUST GRAND JURY PRACTICE
MANUAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1975); M. MALINA, LITIGATING AN ANTITRUST CASE
(1977); Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions.- An
Overview andAnalysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 651, 683-90 (1977).
128. C. HILLS, supra note 127, at 175.
129. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) which permits disclosure of grand jury materials
to "government personnel," without a court order, to aid attorneys for the government in
their investigation. See also infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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but most often this information is used by the Division itself in subsequent
antitrust litigation. 130 The reasons for such extensive use of grand jury
materials stem from the unique and perplexing nature of antitrust litiga-
tion. As one commentator noted, "[t]he process from the inception of the
investigation through the return of an indictment is somewhat involved
and, in many aspects, unique to antitrust."' 31 Requiring state attorneys
general to repeat the entire procedure would contravene the purpose of the
Antitrust Improvements Act, which was designed to encourage the "Fed-
eral Government [to] cooperatefully with the State antitrust enforcers.' 32
Such a requirement would also cast doubt upon the many court decisions
that have sought to effectuate this goal.'
33
Section 4F(b) thus contemplates a symbiotic relationship between the
states and the federal government wherein the states seek relief for state
consumers who have fallen prey to antitrust violators. The federal govern-
ment aids this process by contributing its work product, and in return, re-
ceives needed assistance from the states in the enforcement of federal
antitrust laws. 134 The benefits of such a policy to the public far outstrip
the time-worn policy of grand jury secrecy which can be adequately safe-
guarded by the use of protective orders. 13  Thus, the limitation that has
been imposed on "private" antitrust litigants' use of grand jury materials-
the particularized need requirement-should not govern the access to or
use of that material by state attorneys general in their role as parens pa-
triae. While the courts have not yet held that the "public interest" creates
a per se "particularized need,"136 the Fourth'37 and Ninth' 38 Circuits have
held that requests by state attorneys general for grand jury materials pur-
suant to section 4F(b) of the Act demonstrate a per se particularized need.
Furthermore, the courts have held that the need for secrecy diminishes
130. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 684 (1958); United States v. General Elec.
Co., 209 F. Supp. 197, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
131. Steinhouse, Antitrust Grand Jury Procedure, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 447 (1974).
132. H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 52, at 17.
133. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc. No. 1331 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1981), appeal
pending, No. 81-1059 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cargo Gasoline Co., 1980-81 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,868 (M.D. Fla. 1980), stay denied, No. 81-5128 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Campbell Hardware, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,794 (D. Mass. 1979);
United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,389 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In
re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978).
134. The Department of Justice has taken a position favoring the dissemination of grand
jury materials to the states. See 822 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-1 (1977).
135. See infra text accompanying note 217.
136. United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980).
137. United States v, Colonial Chevrolet Corp., 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).
138. United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
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when disclosure is sought by a public body for use in fulfilling a public
function.' 39 Parens patriae litigation assumes not only a public body act-
ing on behalf of the public, but a governmental unit discharging a public
obligation pursuant to federal law."4
The advancement of the public's interest in effective federal antitrust
enforcement through more liberalized treatment of grand jury disclosure
need not have a parallel detrimental effect upon the preservation of grand
jury secrecy. Such fears are apparently unfounded in light of the federal
experience since the amendment of rule 6 in 1977. Rule 6 now permits
disclosure of grand jury materials to "such government personnel as are
deemed necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney
for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
Federal criminal law."'  When the rule was amended, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee commented that there was "no intent to preclude the use of
grand jury developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes.' ' 42
While the amendment clearly addresses itself to a federal attorney's duty
to enforce federal criminal law, it is equally clear that the rule has been
judicially expanded to include a broader cadre of support personnel to
assist the federal government in its enforcement of the antitrust laws.' 43 In
line with this expansive trend, the Antitrust Improvements Act may be
construed, in effect, as placing state attorneys general in a position analo-
gous to that of government personnel called into service on behalf of the
Department of Justice to ensure civil enforcement of the federal antitrust
laws. Congress's recruitment of the states to assist in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws is consistent with the Antitrust Improvements Act's
139. Soboika, 623 F.2d at 767 (burden of showing particularized need was less compel-
ling since grand jury investigation was completed and the materials were sought in connec-
tion with the "performance of a public duty"). Id
140. See, e.g., Matter of Disclosure of Testimony, Etc. (Troia), 580 F.2d 281, 287 (8th
Cir. 1978) (disclosure of grand jury materials granted to a city "seek[ing] to protect the
public's welfare"); In re the Grand Jury, 1974, 377 F. Supp. 1282, 1282 n.1 (W.D. Okla.
1974) (approving cooperation between state and federal prosecutors in the public interest);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 483 F. Supp. 422, 424 (1979) (federal court has obligation to
cooperate with state officials).
141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
142. S. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 527, 532.
143. While the district courts' constructions of "government personnel" have been
mixed, the trend is toward a liberalization of grand jury disclosure where such disclosure
would facilitate the government's enforcement of antitrust laws. See, e.g., In re 1979 Grand
Jury Proceedings, 479 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (disclosure to non-attorney investigators
who were employees of a municipal government). But see In re Miami Federal Grand Jury,
478 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("government personnel" not likely to include state gov-
ernmental employees).
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broad goal of facilitating cooperation between these governmental units in
the interest of providing effective antitrust enforcement.
The vitality of that provision of the Antitrust Improvements Act provid-
ing for parens patriae actions will depend upon whether the Supreme
Court lends a broad construction to. the Antitrust Improvements Act's
goals and purposes.'" This question of statutory interpretation will have
to be answered with little help from the legislative history. 45 Neverthe-
less, established principles of statutory construction, recent trends in the
case law, and notions of federalism all support a liberal reading of the
parens patriae provision allowing state attorneys general access to grand
jury materials without a separate showing of particularized need. 146
III. GRAND JURY DISCLOSURE IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
This Comment has argued that section 4F should be interpreted to obvi-
ate the particularized need requirement when disclosure requests come
from state attorneys general. This section of the Comment will explore the
practical consequences to state attorneys general should the Supreme
Court hold in Cuisinarts that they, like all other parties seeking disclosure
of grand jury materials, must demonstrate particularized need. It will fo-
cus upon the nature of the demonstration that courts require before con-
cluding that particularized need exists. Consequently, this section will not
only be relevant to state attorneys general, but will also have ramifications
for private parties seeking disclosure of grand jury materials.
While historians have established that the secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings arose from a need to protect the citizenry from the oppression of the
state, they have cautioned that this veil of secrecy was not intended to be a
guise under which the government could amass evidence which then could
be protected from disclosure. 147 Nevertheless, this has been the practical
consequence to date. 14  The state legislatures 149 and lower federal
144. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the Seventh Circuit case, so argument
and a definitive decision on the matter should be forthcoming sometime during the October
1982 term. See supra note 73.
145. The ambiguity of the parens patriae provision of the Antitrust Improvements Act is
evident by the fact that the scant legislative history surrounding it has been marshalled to
support both a liberal and rigid interpretation. See supra text accompanying note 54.
146. But see Kintner, supra note 15, at 30. The authors conclude that grand jury materi-
als may not be provided state attorneys general. They characterize title III of the Antitrust
Improvements Act as a "limited legislative response" to private consumers' inability to effec-
tively avail themselves of the relief provided under the antitrust laws. Id at 19.
147. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1965).
148. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes.- The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668,
668-69 (1962).
149. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 869, 938.1 (West 1970); PA. R. CRIM. P. 310 (Supp.
1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-16 (Supp. 1972).
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courts,150 however, have been eroding the doctrine of secrecy through the
adoption of "open" grand jury systems and liberal construction of the
"particularized need" test. In the wake of this liberalizing trend, the grand
jury has been recognized as a tool of "civil" discovery in antitrust litiga-
tion."'5 Analysis of the status of the "particularized need" standard will
commence with examination of the evolution of the standard.
A. Judicial Evolution of "Particularized Need" Standard
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether and when to
allow disclosure of grand jury materials in United States v. Procter & Gam-
ble.'5 2 Criminal defendants sought production of the federal grand jury
transcripts from an investigation regarding their possible violations of the
Sherman Act. ' 5 3 The government had not asked the grand jury to return
an indictment, and was using the grand jury materials to prepare its civil
case for trial.'54 The district court found that the defendants had shown
"good cause" under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which supports disclosure of grand jury materials where the ends of justice
require it,' 5 and the government's use of that information might result in
an unfair advantage to them in the case. '5 6 In reversing the district court's
disclosure order, the Supreme Court noted that the complexity, length, and
expense of antitrust litigation were not sufficient by themselves to support
a production order. 5 7 Instead, the Court decided that the long-established
policy of maintaining grand jury secrecy could be overcome only by a
showing of "compelling necessity."' 5' The Court found that the appellees
had failed to show "good cause" under rule 34 for the "wholesale discov-
150. See infra notes 180-232 and accompanying text.
151. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1963).
Atlantic Gty was the first case to permit the disclosure of grand jury testimony in a civil
case.
152. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
153. Id at 678.
154. Id at 687 n.2.
155. 19 F.R.D. 122, 126 (D.N.J. 1956); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice to all
other parties. . . the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing. . . of any
designated documents. . . not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence re-
lating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted by Rule
26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control. . ..
156. 19 F.R.D. at 125.
157. 356 U.S. at 683.
158. Id at 682.
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ery" of the grand jury's proceedings. 59 Concluding its opinion with a
rigid rule allowing disclosure only when the government had subverted the
grand jury process, 6 the Court established itself as a staunch guardian of
what it labelled the "indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings.""16
The Supreme Court's next important ruling on the issue came in Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States.'62 Unlike the Procter & Gamble
defendants, the defendants in Pittsburgh Plate did not request "wholesale"
discovery of matters occurring before the grand jury but instead only
sought the discovery of a particular witness's relevant testimony for possi-
ble use on cross-examination at trial.'63 Although the Court realized that
its opinion in Procter & Gamble the year before had suggested that "partic-
ularized need" might include use of grand jury minutes for impeachment
purposes "where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and lim-
itedly," it refused to order disclosure."6 In a lengthy dissent, four justices
took issue with the Court's blind adherence to the doctrine of grand jury
secrecy under circumstances where disclosure would "further the fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice."' 65
Seven years later, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Dennis v.
United States,'66 that defense counsel may have access to relevant portions
of a trial witness's grand jury testimony upon a showing of particularized
need. The Court emphasized the "growing realization that disclosure,
rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice."' 67 It found that none of the
traditional reasons for nondisclosure 168 were applicable in Dennis due to
159. Id at 683.
160. Id
161. Id at 682 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)).
162. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
163. Id. at 396.
164. Id at 399. The Court, citing Procter & Gamble, listed three instances sufficient to
meet the "particularized need" standard: "to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection,
to test his credibility and the like." Id
165. Id at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
167. Id at 870.
168. The traditional policy considerations underlying the doctrine of grand jury secrecy
were recognized by the majority in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395,
399 (1959). These same considerations were also recognized and enumerated by the dissent:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have informa-
tion with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who
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the fifteen year lapse between the grand jury proceedings and the trial, and
the fact that the charge could not be sustained without the testimony of
four key witnesses before the grand jury.'6 9
Before Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,17 0 the only cases in
which the Supreme Court had considered the applicable standard for dis-
closure of grand jury transcripts involved requests by defendants in crimi-
nal or civil antitrust actions. Douglas Oil Co. was the first case in which
the Court decided the availability of grand jury transcripts to private
treble-damages action plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, independent gasoline deal-
ers, brought civil antitrust actions against several large oil companies.'
7
'
During the pretrial stages of the case, a federal antitrust investigation
culminated in the indictment of Petrol Stops, the civil defendant in Doug-
las Oil Co.. 72 After Petrol Stops pleaded nolo contendere to the criminal
charges, Douglas Oil petitioned the district court for the transcripts of cer-
tain grand jury witnesses.' 73 The district court ordered disclosure of the
requested materials as "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding,"'74  and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 75
On appeal, the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged test for deter-
mining whether the "particularized need" standard has been satisfied. The
Court stated that "[p]arties seeking grand jury transcripts under rule 6(e)
must show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injus-
tice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater
than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to
cover only material so needed."' 76 Although the Court did not concede
that it had lowered the standard of proof required by Procter & Gamble
and Dennis, the Court did state that "as the considerations justifying se-
crecy become less relevant, a party asserting a need for grand jury tran-
scripts will have a lesser burden in showing justification."' 7 7 The Douglas
is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he had been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Pittsburgh Plate, 360 U.S. at 399 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d
Cir. 1954)). See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10
(1979).
169. 384 U.S. at 872-73.
170. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
171. Id at 213.
172. Id at 215.
173. Id at 215-16.
174. Id at 220.
175. Petrol Stops Northwest v. United States, 571 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1978).
176. 441 U.S. at 222.
177. Id at 224 n.14.
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Oil Co. Court concurred in the lower court's findings that secrecy was
no longer a substantial factor because the grand jury proceeding had ter-
minated three years before and the transcripts had already been released to
the petitioners.' 78 Nevertheless, it held that the disclosure decision was
flawed because these lower courts knew little about the civil case and
merely speculated as to the relevancy the transcripts would have in the
civil suit.'
79
B. A Framework/or Disclosure
The Dennis Court's admission that traditional reasons for grand jury
secrecy were inapplicable in that case 8 ° and the Douglas Oil Co. Court's
three-part test' 8 ' indicate the Court's increasing willingness to tip the
scales in favor of disclosure of grand jury materials when the circum-
stances justifying secrecy become less relevant. Implicit in these decisions
is the Court's recognition of certain factors that militate against rigid appli-
cation of the particularized need standard. Instead of precipitously invok-
ing the doctrine of grand jury secrecy, the Court has begun to scrutinize
closely the policies favoring grand jury secrecy and to examine the various
factors supporting and opposing disclosure in each case.
Lower federal courts have followed this lead and have begun to balance
more carefully the various factors involved before deciding whether to or-
der disclosure of grand jury materials.' 2 Although this more deliberative
process does not always result in disclosure, recent decisions evidence
movement toward a sound and thoughtful approach to the disclosure
question.
This recent, more liberal treatment of the disclosure question should not
be interpreted as an abandonment of the "particularized need" standard.
It is extremely unlikely that the doctrine of grand jury secrecy protected by
this standard will ever be completely abandoned by the courts. Instead,
the judicial evolution from blind adherence to the particularized need
standard of Procter & Gamble to the more reasonable rule of Douglas Oil
Co. has proceeded cautiously. It is only through examination of the policy
considerations surrounding grand jury disclosure and identification of the
pertinent, recurring factors bearing on the issue that a useful framework
178. Id. at 223.
179. Id at 222.
180. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 872 n. 18: "None of the reasons traditionally advanced to justify
non-disclosure of grand jury minutes are [sic] significant here." (parenthetical note omit-
ted). See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
181. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 147-234.
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may be constructed for determining the likelihood of a court's granting
disclosure.
1. Policy Analysis
The five policy considerations traditionally advanced in favor of grand
jury secrecy were originally formulated a half-century ago by a Maryland
federal district court. In United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical
Corp. ,'83 the court reasoned that grand jury proceedings should be kept
secret: 1) to prevent flight by those whose indictment is contemplated;
2) to allow the grand jury freedom in its deliberations; 3) to prevent tam-
pering with witnesses; 4) to encourage others to come forward with infor-
mation regarding the commission of crimes; and 5) to protect the innocent
accused.84 These same policy considerations have -subsequently been
adopted by the Supreme Court in Procter & Gamble'15 and by a host of
lower courts."6 Other than for a perfunctory citation to the five policies,
however, most opinions have ignored the Amazon court's underlying anal-
ysis as to the degree of their importance and their limited applicability.
The Amazon court based all its reasons for secrecy, except protection of
the innocent accused, on the protection of the grand jury "as the direct
independent representative of the public as a whole ... 187 Recent
courts have begun to recognize 188 that most of the Amazon policies favor-
ing secrecy are only operative while a particular grand jury is sitting. The
only policy considerations that remain beyond termination of the grand
jury are protection of the innocent accused and the effect disclosure may
183. 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md. 1931). Amazon involved the sufficiency of indictments charg-
ing the defendant corporation with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The
court held that the presence of a stenographer in the grand jury room did not invalidate the
indictments. Id at 259-61.
184. Id at 261.
185. 356 U.S. at 681 n.6. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395, 405 (1959) and Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n.10.
186. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, Ven-Fuel, 510 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla.
1981); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444 (D.C. Del. 1980); United States v. White
Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 449 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
187. Amazon, 55 F.2d at 261.
188. In In re Miami Federal Grand Jury, No. 79-8, the court stated that the rationale for
grand jury secrecy is at its strongest when the grand jury is still in session. 478 F. Supp. 490
(S.D. Fla. 1979). In In re Grand Jury, the court concluded that after the termination of the
grand jury's proceedings, most of the policy reasons for secrecy are inapplicable: "[t]he
indicted will not flee; the investigation has not been impeded; witnesses cannot be bribed or
intimidated; it is less likely that an innocent person will suffer injury to his reputation." 583
F.2d 128, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961 (7th Cir.
1977); In re Grand Jury Investigation, Ven-Fuel, 510 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Fla. 1981);
United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444 (D. Del. 1980).
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have on future grand juries.' 9 In the context of civil antitrust damage
actions brought subsequent to the grand jury's termination, even these pol-
icy considerations become less viable as the need for disclosure becomes
more compelling. 190
The policy of protecting the innocent accused is based upon the belief
that the public's awareness of a grand jury investigation of a particular
target, even though no indictment is returned, may subject him to public
scrutiny and irreparable injury to reputation. 19' Use of the term innocent
"accused," to describe one under grand jury investigation, is somewhat of a
misnomer because individuals under investigation are not formally
charged or "accused" of crime unless and until an indictment against them
is returned by the grand jury.'9 2 Furthermore, the substantive policy of
protecting the innocent accused becomes less compelling in the antitrust
arena because most of the accused are corporate defendants. The Supreme
Court has held that corporations are not entitled to the same constitutional
rights as individuals.' 93 Finally, if indictments are returned by the grand
jury, this policy is no longer relevant to the disclosure question.
The only policy consideration that survives the grand jury's termination,
regardless of whether an indictment is returned, is the effect of disclosure
on future grand juries. This interest is often expressed in terms of protect-
ing grand jury witnesses who, if they knew their testimony would become
public, would be more guarded in their answers and thereby diminish the
189. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 115 (D.D.C.
1980) (where disclosure would cause strain in and adversity to objecting parties' careers and
have chilling effect on future grand jury testimony, disclosure of grand jury materials would
not be ordered); United States v. Mahoney, 495 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (when
grand jury completes its work and adjourns only one of the reasons for secrecy remains:
encouragement of free disclosure by persons who have information regarding commission of
crimes); accord, In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 47, 49 (D. Mass. 1981).
190. See, e.g., In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 47 (D. Mass. 1981). That case
involved multidistrict litigation wherein civil antitrust plaintiffs were granted access to the
transcripts of three individuals who had testified before the grand jury which returned an
indictment in connection with an antitrust conspiracy. The court reasoned that "this general.
concern [effect of disclosure upon future grand juries] must be weighed with the need for
secrecy in a particular case, balanced against the need for disclosure." Id at 49. For further
authority in support of this proposition, see United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 663 (2d
Cir. 1978); Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977);
United States v. Mahoney, 495 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1980); SEC v. Everest Manage-
ment Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
191. See Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222.
192. A grand jury is convened to determine "if there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed .... " Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972).
193. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (corporation may not assert fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
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effectiveness of the grand jury.'9 4 Although protection of witnesses is a
noble aim, complete secrecy is unnecessary in the antitrust context because
witnesses are usually employees of the suspect corporation. Therefore,
copies of their testimony are discoverable by the corporation under Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A).' 95 Because the witness's cor-
porate-employer is the one most likely to render retribution, the efficacy of
this policy consideration is substantially weakened. Moreover, any witness
who gives damaging testimony before the grand jury may be reasonably
certain that his testimony will be required at trial.
As a result, a close scrutiny of Amazon reveals that only two policies
have any application after the grand jury's termination. Even then, neither
of these remaining interests survives analysis unscathed. The interest in
"free and untramelled" disclosure by future grand juries is already handi-
capped by implementation of rule 16(a)(1)(A), while the interest in pro-
tecting the innocent accused has never been absolute and is further
weakened in the context of corporate defendants. Courts must then bal-
ance these two "diminished" policy interests against the policies favoring
disclosure.
Policy interests favoring disclosure stem from a litigant's need to secure
the accuracy and truth of a witness's testimony. The Supreme Court rec-
ognized this interest in Procter & Gamble where it identified three in-
stances where the policies in favor of grand jury secrecy could be
overcome in the interest of securing the truth. These included using the
grand jury transcripts to impeach, refresh, and test the credibility of a wit-
ness. '96 Disclosure, in such cases, ensures not only the accuracy of a par-
194. In Procter & Gamble, the Court noted that witnesses may be inhibited by the knowl-
edge that "the secrecy of their testimony [may) be lifted tomorrow." 356 U.S. at 682.
195. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(I)(A) provides that
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy ... recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury which re-
lates to the offense charged. Where the defendant is a corporation, partnership,
association, or labor union, the court may grant the defendant, upon its motion,
discovery of relevant recorded testimony of any witness before a grand jury who(1) was, at the time of his testimony, so situated as an officer or employee as to have
been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to conduct constituting the of-
fense, or (2) was, at the time of the offense, personally involved in the alleged
conduct constituting the offense and so situated as an officer or employee as to have
been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which
he was involved.
See United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1969) (statements made by present and
former officers and employees relating to their employment held discoverable as statements
of the corporate defendant).
196. 356 U.S. at 683.
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ticular witness's testimony, but also contributes to a fair outcome of the
litigation.
On an even broader scale, grand jury disclosure can facilitate civil en-
forcement of federal antitrust laws. The imposition of criminal sanctions
upon corporate entities or their officers does not adequately redress the
injury suffered by those at the hands of antitrust violators. Subsequent
civil antitrust damage actions can effectuate this interest by exacting mone-
tary penalties from violators to compensate the injured. Grand jury dis-
closure helps expedite litigation, thus reducing the public cost of litigation
and providing speedy recovery to those actually injured. Nondisclosure
can only frustrate the process and impede antitrust enforcement because
grand jury materials are the single most important source of information
to an antitrust litigant.' 97 The efficacy and cost considerations surround-
ing dissemination of grand jury materials need not, however, entail a mas-
sive and irresponsible intrusion into grand jury secrecy when responsibly
administered and overseen by the courts.
As the Amazon court long ago recognized, a cautious and careful ap-
proach must be taken to the application of the rule of secrecy. 98 Such an
approach is consistent with and complements the "common law right of
access to public records [which] must clearly be tempered by the rule of
secrecy."' 99 In line with this accommodation of competing policies, the
Ninth Circuit recently recognized "a limited right of access to grand jury
records which interested members of the public have standing to assert.,, 200
Applicability of the common law right of access which is unique to Ameri-
can jurisprudence, to the question of grand jury disclosure, may weigh
heavily upon the common law doctrine of secrecy spurned by a closed
English system of jurisprudence.
The above analysis demonstrates that the court's task in balancing these
197. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
199. In re Special Grand Jury (For Anchorage, Alaska), 674 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir.
1982). As support for its position that a common law right of access exists, the Ninth Circuit
looked to the United States Supreme Court's recent observation that
[iut is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and
copy public records and documents. In contrast to the English practice ....
American decisions generally do not condition enforcement on a proprietary inter-
est in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit. The interest
necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found...
in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
200. Anchorage, Alaska, 674 F.2d at 780.
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competing interests is not an easy one. The outcome will be determined by
a "factor" analysis that attempts to "temper" secrecy considerations by
factoring in variables that will help the court to both identify and quantify
the "needs" of the particular party seeking disclosure.
2. Factor Analysis
The courts have identified certain factors that may tip the scales in favor
of disclosure. These factors fit into three basic categories: timing, safety,
and subject-matter. Several of the variables included within the timing
factor are the stage of the grand jury's proceedings during which disclosure
is requested; whether the grand jury witnesses have already testified at the
criminal trial; whether and to whom disclosure has already been made;
and whether or not the grand jury witnesses are or will be scheduled for
deposition or testimony in the subsequent civil proceeding. The safety fac-
tor concerns whether any remnant of secrecy interest can be adequately
served by appropriate protective orders. The subject-matter factor ad-
dresses the type of grand jury materials requested. Despite this pigeon-
holing of relevant factors, their recognition and persuasive weight rests
within the discretion of the court.2°' Although the results are not always
uniform, a study of the pattern of the factors which courts find most per-
suasive is useful.
While the timing and safety factors clearly have a substantial impact on
the disclosure question, some courts hold that the mere subject matter of
the request-documents versus transcripts-is potentially dispositive of the
entire issue.2"2 The logic of the document/transcript distinction is based
on the argument that documents do not in and of themselves disclose
"matters occurring before the grand jury."203 In Golden Quality Ice Cream
201. The Court in Douglas Oil Co., emphasized that a court deciding a disclosure ques-
tion "necessarily is infused with substantial discretion." 441 U.S. at 223. See also Pittsburgh
Plate, 360 U.S. at 395, 399; SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1980 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,192 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1980).
202. The United States Supreme Court, however, has at least implied that documents
should be treated the same as transcripts. See Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. 211; see also Texas
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626, 628 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1962); In re the United States for Dis-
closure of Grand Jury Matters (Miller Brewing Co.), 518 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Wis. 1981);
Corona Constr. Co. v. Ampress Brick Co., 376 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Il. 1974); In re Califor-
nia, 195 F. Supp. 37, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
203. This logic has been countered with the argument that the broader the document
request, the more likely it would be to reveal the pattern of the grand jury's investigation
which, in any case, may be even more telling than the testimony of any single witness. See
Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Kessler, 489 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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Co. v. Dee.q5eld Speciality, the court granted the plaintifis request for doc-
uments turned over to the grand jury which had completed its work. 4"
Finding that disclosure of documents is not prohibited by rule 6(e), the
court held that the particularized need standard only applies to the discov-
ery of grand jury transcripts.2 °5
Other courts take a middle-of-the-road approach, asserting that docu-
ments should be more readily subject to disclosure than transcripts of testi-
mony, but should not be automatically disclosed.2° Still other courts have
employed a purpose test which premises release of documents subpoenaed
by the grand jury upon a showing of a legitimate purpose by the party
seeking disclosure.20 7 The most well-reasoned approach, however, and
that in conformity with the in-depth factual analysis relative to time and
safety factors, requires a factual inquiry into whether the documents tend
to reveal the actual proceedings before the grand jury. If so, the require-
ments of rule 6(e) must be satisfied.20 8
Illinois v. Sarbaugh21 is a fertile example of the factor analysis now
being employed by some courts to determine the disclosure question. In
Sarbaugh, the Department of Justice instituted a criminal antitrust investi-
gation of highway construction contractors for possible Sherman Act vio-
lations in connection with a bid-rigging onspiracy210 Employees of the
204. 87 F.R.D. 53, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
205. Id Further support for the proposition that documents are never subject to the
disclosure restrictions of rule 6(e) can be found in United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622,
627 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-
Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
206. See Cuisinarts, 516 F. Supp. at 1008, 1022 n.17; Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768,
772 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub non J. L. Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 889 (1977);
Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 512 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Grand Jury
Which Presented Criminal Indictments 76-149 & 77-72, 469 F. Supp. 666, 671 (D.C. Pa.
1978).
207. See United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960) (dis-
closure to further lawful agency investigation); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F. Supp.
978, 982 (D. Me. 1981); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 87 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Brink v. DaLesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 668-69 (D. Md. 1979); United States v. Saks & Co.,
426 F. Supp. 812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (disclosure to further lawful agency investigation);
Capitol Indem. Corp. v. First Minn. Constr. Co., 405 F. Supp. 929, 931 (D. Mass. 1975)
(disclosure to further discovery in civil litigation).
208. See In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 662 F.2d 1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1981):
Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869-70
(D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 630 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1081 (1981); In re Doe Grand Jury Proceedings, 537 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.I.
1982); United States v. Monsour, 508 F. Supp. 168 (D.C. Pa. 1981).
209. 552 F.2d 768 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nor. J.L. Simmons Co. v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
889 (1977).
210. 552 F.2d at 771.
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defendant corporations were called to testify both before the grand jury
and during the subsequent criminal proceedings. The court granted the
corporate defendants access to this testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A),21' which allows disclosure to corporations
of their own employees' testimony. After the grand jury's discharge, the
state filed a treble-damage action against the corporations named in the
criminal proceeding and five other companies.21 2 The state requested dis-
closure of the same grand jury transcripts that had been disclosed to the
defendants.213
The first factor addressed by the court was the need for disclosure which
"arises from a litigant's interest in securing accurate and truthful testimony
from witnesses." 214 If a witness had previously testified at trial or in a
deposition about matters concerning his grand jury testimony, the court
found no reason for not allowing the use of the witness's earlier grand jury
testimony "to assure the accuracy of his later testimony." 21 5 Furthermore,
the fact that some of the defendants had already obtained access to the
grand jury transcripts raised the possibility that they would obtain an "un-
fair advantage" in the litigation.2 6 Combining these factors with the
plaintiff's scheduling of the grand jury witnesses for testimony at trial or
deposition, the court granted disclosure subject to appropriate protective
orders.21 7
211. Id For the relevant portions of rule 16(a)(1)(A), see supra note 195.
212. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d at 771,
213. Id
214. Id at 775.
215. Id at 776. In In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Tex. 1975), this
same factor was applied to a witness to an earlier grandjury proceeding. In that case, the
court authorized disclosure to witnesses scheduled to appear before a federal grand jury of
their prior testimony concerning the same events given to an earlier grand jury conducting
the same investigation. Id. at 346. See also In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F.
Supp. 1282, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D.R.I. 1972).
216. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d at 776 (citing Dennis, 384 U.S. at 873); accord Douglas Oil Co.,
441 U.S. at 211; U.S. Indust., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965); In re Cement-Concrete Block, 381 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill.
1974). Contra In re Grand Jury Criminal Indictments 76-149 & 77-72 in Middle District of
Pa., 469 F. Supp. 666, 670 n.6 (D. Pa. 1978) (disclosure in a subsequent civil proceeding is
not automatic simply because corporate defendants have been given access to their employ-
ees' grand jury testimony).
217. 552 F.2d at 777. A major condition of the protective orders instituted in Sarbaugh
was "use." The transcripts could only be used in "that litigation (and] only for the purposes
of impeachment, refreshing the witness' recollection and testing credibility." Id (quoting In
re Cement-Concrete Block, Chicago Area, Grand Jury Proceedings, 381 F. Supp. 1108, 1110
(N.D. Ill. 1974)). The district court was directed to release the transcripts "to a single attor-
ney for plaintiff," who would have sole custody of the documents and who would maintain a
log indicating who had seen what portion of each transcript and when they had seen it.
There was to be no copying and the materials were to be returned when no longer needed
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The importance of judicial discretion underlying a factor analysis such
as that employed by the Seventh Circuit in Sarbaugh is illustrated by the
district court's decision in United States v. White Ready-Mix Concrete
Co. ,2" which distinguished each of the factors upon which the Sarbaugh
court relied in granting disclosure. White Ready-Mix Concrete involved a
disclosure request by civil antitrust plaintiffs for grand jury transcripts and
other materials that resulted in indictments against seven corporations and
five individuals for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy.2" 9 The district court
found the Sarbaugh analysis inapplicable because the court in the criminal
proceeding had "refused to release the transcripts of certain officers and
employees to the corporate defendants on the grounds that an employee-
witness does not necessarily have interests coextensive with those of the
corporation.""22 Furthermore, the plaintiffs had not scheduled depositions
for those whose grand jury transcripts it sought.22' The court applied an
exhaustion principle and found the plaintiffs' failure to pursue every avail-
able civil discovery method before petitioning for disclosure fatal to their
request. 222 In deference to the criminal court's decision not to release the
transcripts to the criminal defendants, the timing factor seems to have been
strictly construed by the court. Although the White Ready-Mix Concrete
court recognized the Sarbaugh factors, it unnecessarily saddled plaintiffs
with time consuming and wasteful machinations before those factors
would be given any significant weight.
In In re Screws Antitrust Litigation ,223 a reasonable balance seems to
have been struck between the less demanding factor analysis of Sarbaugh
and the considerably stricter factor analysis of White Ready-Mix Concrete.
Screws involved multidistrict litigation wherein plaintiff sought the tran-
scripts of four individuals who testified before the grand jury which re-
turned an indictment against defendants in an alleged price-fixing
for "the prescribed use." Also, the defendant could challenge, on motion in the district
court, disclosure of any portion of any transcript not bearing on the antitrust action.
218. 509 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
219. Id at 748.
220. Id at 749. In support of this proposition, see United States v. Atlantic Container
Line, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 115 (D.D.C. 1980) (disclosure of grand jury materials would not be
ordered where it would cause strain and adversity to the objecting parties' careers).
221. 509 F. Supp. at 748.
222. Id Although petitioners did serve interrogatories on the corporate officers and em-
ployees who might possess knowledge of the price-fixing arrangements, they plead the fifth
amendment. This did not, however, convince the court of the necessity of producing the
transcripts. The court reprimanded petitioners for failing to compel answers to the interrog-
atories and for failing to seek depositions. Id
223. 91 F.R.D. 47 (D. Mass. 1981).
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conspiracy.224 The court identified the following factors in rendering its
decision: the probability of the grand jury witness's appearance at the civil
trial, the release of the transcripts to the defendants prior to the criminal
proceeding and the trustworthiness of the testimony of those who appeared
at the criminal trial.225 Of the four witnesses whose grand jury transcripts
were sought, all but one had testified at the criminal trial.226 The plaintiff
had deposed all four witnesses, but each invoked the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination at these depositions.22' Furthermore,
each of the defendants in the civil suit had received, prior to the criminal
trial, the grand jury transcripts of no less than sixty persons, including
most of the testimony of the four whose transcripts were sought.228 The
court released, subject to appropriate protective orders, 229 the grand jury
transcripts of the three defendants who had testified at the criminal trial.2 a°
The testimony of the fourth witness was not disclosed because he did not
testify at the criminal trial and was an unindicted coconspirator.23'
The even-handed reasoning of the Screws court is attractive in that the
court was unwilling to compromise the secrecy of the grand jury proceed-
ings on the basis of mere conclusory allegations that the fourth witness's
transcript contained useful and relevant testimony.232 At the same time,
however, the court did not require an exhaustive display of unavailing,
expensive, and time-consuming discovery attempts to conclude that the
other defendants were not going to be forthright.23 3 Other courts that have
granted disclosure without requiring an exhaustive demonstration of gen-
erally futile discovery attempts234 may be similarly commended.
224. Id
225. Id
226. Id at 48-49.
227. Id at 49.
228. Id
229. Id at 51. The court ordered that the transcripts be released to plaintiffs "with the
same deletions the government made prior to their release to defendants in the criminal
trial." Id The transcripts were to be used solely by counsel of record and their experts and
were not to be discussed or disclosed for any other purpose. Finally, all copies were to be
returned at the close of the litigation. Id
230. Id
231. Id
232. The interest in protecting a grand jury witness who was not indicted and not called
to testify at the criminal proceeding is admittedly great. Such a witness is the person most
likely to have lead the prosecutor to those likely to have knowledge of and/or have partici-
pated in the wrongdoing.
233. Compare Wite Ready-Mix Concrete, 509 F. Supp. at 748 with Screws, 91 F.R.D. at
47.
234. For instances where courts have granted access without such an exhaustive display,
see In re December 1974 Term Grand Jury Investigation, 449 F. Supp. 743, 750-51 (D. Md.
1978) (court required only "some rational connection with a specific existing or contem-
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The above factor analysis is intended to be a guide from which one may
identify, analyze, and predict those factual circumstances most likely to
result in a court's granting disclosure of grand jury materials in a subse-
quent civil antitrust action. It must be remembered, however, that the rel-
ative strength and applicability of these factors considered alone or in
combination will be subject to the discretion of the court. A final caution
is necessary to those who may perceive this expanded factor analysis now
being employed by the courts as a weakening of the particularized need
standard. While courts no longer apply the standard mechanically, the
judiciary is not unmindful of the importance of grand jury secrecy and has
manifested this concern through the imposition of exacting and mandatory
protective orders.
If any conclusion may be drawn from the courts' imposition of a factor
type analysis, it is that the judiciary has finally begun to give true recogni-
tion to the competing interests involved in the resolution of disclosure
questions. The judiciary's willingness to assume this considerably more
complex task is refreshing indeed, and will result in a realistic approach to
the maintenance of grand jury secrecy when the circumstances so warrant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The grand jury, with its attendant secrecy doctrine, is a unique and
prized institution of the American legal system that permits nonprofes-
sional participation in the decisionmaking process. Its hallowed history
and favored position, however, should not be permitted to thwart the
equally important and competing goal of efficient administration of the
antitrust laws. The need for grand jury secrecy is admittedly less stringent
in a modern democracy where fear of grand jury subversion to ensure gov-
ernmental control is no longer an acceptable reason for completely en-
shrouding its proceedings.
Implicit in the passage of section 4F(b) of the Antitrust Improvements
Act is Congress's recognition of the integral and necessary part that grand
jury materials can play in the enforcement of federal antitrust laws by state
attorneys general. Similarly the judiciary, through its erosion of the strict
plated judicial proceeding"); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 639
(D.D.C. 1977) (use of material for impeachment is sufficient); In re Cement-Concrete Block,
Chicago Area, Grand Jury Proeeedings, 381 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (same); Illinois v.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (same); see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1978). Contra Matter of Grand Jury, 469 F. Supp.
666 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (neither the need to impeach witnesses or refresh their recollections nor
the fact that some witnesses had invoked the fifth amendment in response to depositions was
sufficient showing upon which to grant disclosure).
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"particularized need" standard, is advancing a more flexible and better
reasoned analysis where the disclosure question arises in the context of
private antitrust litigation. Developments such as these can further only a
more enlightened and realistic approach in the application of the secrecy
doctrine to antitrust litigation.
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